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GOOD FAITH IN ARTICLES 1 AND 2 OF THE U.C.C.:
THE PRACTICE VIEW
STEVEN J. BURTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code is a remarkably successful
achievement, both for its innovations in contract and commercial
law and for its near-uniform acceptance in the United States.
Not the least of its achievements is the institution of a Perma-
nent Editorial Board that monitors its operation, issues com-
mentaries, and proposes revisions from time to time. Articles 1
and 2 currently are under revision. No one doubts that these
articles have flaws, some of which glare in the light of four de-
cades of experience. The present statutory articulation of good
faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts is among
the significant flaws.1
The drafters of the U.C.C. did not think they were doing any-
thing novel by codifying requirements of good faith.2 Judicial
practice over the years generally has favored the drafters' under-
* William G. Hammond Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I thank Professor
Eric G. Andersen and Judge Richard A. Posner for their comments on the manu-
script.
1. Section 1-203 currently provides: "Every contract or duty within this Act im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203
(1990). Several provisions in Articles 1 and 2 impose specific requirements of good
faith as particular applications of the Article 1 obligation. See, e.g., id. §§ 1-208,
2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1), 2-706(5), 2-712(1). Other provisions further implement the
Article 1 obligation without mentioning good faith in their texts. Id. § 1-203 cmt.
Unless the context otherwise requires, Article 1 defines good faith for the entire
U.C.C. as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Id. § 1-201(19).
For transactions within Article 2, " '[glood faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade." Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
2. Professor Karl Llewellyn stated during the New York Law Revision
Commission's hearings in 1954 that "good faith has been a part of mercantile obliga-
tion since American law began." Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum, 1 STATE OF N.Y.
LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT,. HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 106,
115 (reprint ed. 1980) (1954). Professor Edwin W. Patterson provided the same com-
mission with an analysis showing that the obligation was well established in New
York case law. 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMIN REPORT. STUDY OF THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 310-15 (reprint ed. 1980) (1955).
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standing. With rare exception, the courts use the U.C.C. good
faith requirements in aid and furtherance of the parties' agree-
ment, not to override the parties' agreement for reasons of fair-
ness, policy, or morality.3 Judicial practice generally has fol-
lowed the counterpart common law obligation,4 often without
distinguishing clearly statutory from common law authorities.5
3. See STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH
(forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 4); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3
(1981) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith Performance] (stating that good faith perfor-
mance as used by the courts serves to "effectuate the intentions of the parties, or
protect their reasonable expectations"); see also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: COMMENTARY ON SECTION 1-203, at 3 (Proposed Final Draft Jan. 27, 1993),
reprinted in [Findex/PEB Commentary] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) [hereinafter
PEB COMMENTARY SECTION 1-203] ("[Olne acts in good faith relative to the
agreement of the parties.").
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see Eric G. Andersen,
Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 345-48 (1988);
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 371 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Con-
tract]; Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, More
on Good Faith]; Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75
IOWA L. REV. 861, 861-62 (1990).
5. E.g., California v. Chevron Corp., 872 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990); Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F.
Supp. 1439, 1451-52 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d
272, 275 (Ala. 1979); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Mass.
1980); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).
The greatest volume of litigation under Article 2 involves output and re-
quirements contracts governed by § 2-306(1). Courts and commentators agree that
the good faith performance obligation in these cases is the same as the preexisting
common law obligation. See, e.g., Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d
320, 322 (N.Y. 1975); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 4-13 (3d ed. 1987); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.15 (2d ed.
1990); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-8
(3d ed. 1988); Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 4, at 395-97; Burton, Good
Faith Performance, supra note 3, at 7-9; Stacy A. Silkworth, Quantity Variation in
Open Quantity Contracts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 243 (1990) (stating that at least
one court has suggested that the U.C.C. has codified the common law); John C.
Weistart, Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the UCC,
1973 DUKE L.J. 599. Consequently, varying the general U.C.C. obligation from the
common law counterpart obligation without upsetting this body of happily settled
law would be difficult. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271,
296-303 (1992).
THE PRACTICE VIEW OF GOOD FAITH
On their face, the U.C.C. good faith requirements are stated
in the vaguest of terms, supported by definitions either too limit-
ed to be taken seriously in the performance and enforcement
context (honesty in fact),6 or as opaque as good faith itself (rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade).' In
practice, most courts find their way to a reasonable construction
of the obligation following litigation. Great resources, however,
may be consumed in this process. A few courts have used the
doctrinal vagueness as a pretext to impose unprecedented liabili-
ties on commercial parties, notably lenders and suppliers to
dealers or franchisees.8 Just enough unorthodox judgments oc-
cur to inspire ever-optimistic plaintiffs' counsel to keep the law-
suits coming.
A revision of Articles 1 and 2 should clarify the distinctions
between good and bad faith in contract performance and enforce-
ment so that plaintiffs will bring suits only when they stand a
reasonable chance of succeeding and of succeeding for good rea-
sons. This Article proposes a revision of the basic good faith re-
quirement (section 1-203) and the definitions of good faith in
Articles 1 and 2 (assuming these articles retain roughly their
present shape)? Bearing in mind the judicial propensity to mix
statutory and common law authorities in good faith cases and a
legislator's limited power to change settled judicial practices of
this kind, this Article further proposes a codification of good
faith that articulates the normative sense in judicial practice
under the existing U.C.C. and the common law."
Accordingly, the revised Articles 1 and 2 should make two
things clear. First, the good faith requirement limits a party's
discretion in contract performance and enforcement. Second, in
6. See U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (1990).
7. See id.
8. E.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Atlan-
tic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 294
A.2d 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), affd, 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973). The
Razumic holding was narrowed in Amoco Oil Co. v. Burns, 437 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1981).
9. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(b) (1990).
10. Following the practice of the courts, in the absence of any existing provision
defining the applicability of Article 1, and not knowing with what scope the revised
Article 1 will apply, I will take into account in this Article commercial cases wheth-
er governed by the U.C.C. or the common law, including notably loan contracts.
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order to protect justifiable expectations arising from an
agreement, good faith limits discretion by requiring a discretion-
exercising party to act only for reasons allowed by the parties'
agreement when understood in the context in which it was
made. This approach will be called the "practice view" of good
faith because it codifies judicial practice.
II. A CRITIQUE AND A PROPOSAL
The abstractness of "good faith" allows advocates to project
onto it any of many meanings. To some, good faith might require
a contract party to act as a good and upright person, under the
same set of circumstances, would act.1 To others, it might re-
quire compliance with communitarian or moral obligations. 2 To
still others, it might require a contract party to do whatever has
the best consequences for both parties and the greater good,
which would require acting as the parties would have agreed
they should act had they negotiated on the matter under condi-
tions congenial to economic efficiency." Good faith is sometimes
considered a license to weigh all relevant factors on a case-by-
case basis using situational ethics. 4 Some may embrace "good
11. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 230-48 (1991).
12. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, TOWARD A CRITI-
CISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 210 (1976) (stating that to act in good faith is to exercise
formal entitlements in the spirit of solidarity); B.J. Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts,
17 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 716-17 (1983).
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 91 (4th ed. 1992).
14. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 820-25 (1982) [hereinafter Summers,
General Duty]; Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 199-206
(1968) [hereinafter Summers, "Good Faith]. Professor Summers' excluder analysis
informs the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979). In brief, his
analysis holds that "good faith" has no positive meaning of its own, but rules out
particular and heterogeneous instances of bad faith. See Summers, General Duty,
supra, at 820-21. When a new case is presented, a judge should reason by analogy
from cases of bad faith, taking into account all relevant factors, to do justice. See id.
at 823-24.
I presented my views on excluder analysis in Burton, More on Good Faith,
supra note 4, at 499. To review key points of disagreement, excluder analysis focus-
es exclusively on cases of bad faith. See id. at 498. Most of the relevant precedents,
however, hold that a party acted in good faith. In my view, a judge should consider
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faith" as a doctrinal basis for reforming contract law so as to
admit "relational obligations" not arising from the parties' agree-
ment.'6
We are concerned with good faith, not as an abstract question,
but as a legal requirement with practical consequences for com-
mercial transactions. "Good faith" may take on a concrete mean-
ing in the context of a practice that uses the concept. Like any
term, it may be understood and applied in practice with a con-
sistency of meaning that is missing from its abstract semantics.
In fact, concrete and sensible meanings for good faith in contract
performance and enforcement are emerging in judicial practice. I
propose that the revised Articles 1 and 2 should reflect the judi-
cial experience.
A. Critique
Within the U.C.C., "good faith" functions in a variety of con-
texts with differing legal consequences. First, in the context of
good faith purchase and holder in due course problems, good
faith allocates the priorities among multiple claimants of proper-
ty by setting a condition to a valid claim of ownership by a
transferee. 6 Second, bad faith may amount to fraud in contract
formation or by debtors in possession of collateral or goods,'
analogically whether a new case is more like the precedents finding good faith than
like those finding bad faith. A judge, however, cannot rely solely on analogies to
decide a new problem case. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND
LEGAL REASONING 31-36 (1985). A judge must use a rule, principle, policy, or con-
vention of practice to decide whether similarities or differences are more important
under the circumstances. See id.; MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COM-
MON LAW 83-96 (1988). By emphasizing the heterogeneity of cases of bad faith, ex-
cluder analysis denies the availability of needed rules, principles, policies, or conven-
tions. Moreover, excluder analysis also could apply in reverse: one could determine
what bad faith is by first asking what have courts found to be instances of good
faith and reasoning by analogy from these cases? If we apply it both ways, excluder
analysis is meaningless, yet no apparent reason exists why we should not apply
excluder analysis both ways. See also Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Lia-
bility, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 TEX.'L. REV. 169, 199-202 (1989).
15. See infra notes 108-09, 117-27 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1), 2-706(5), 3-302(1), 7-404, 9-206(1) (1990).
17. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-328(4), 2-402(2). The common law of fraud remains applica-
ble to U.C.C. transactions unless displaced by particular provisions therein. Id. § 1-
103.
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which may both invalidate a contract and ground an action in
tort for compensation. 8 Third, in contract modifications, bad
faith may invalidate a modification for reasons more akin to
duress. 9 Fourth, in contract performance, good faith is a basis
for implying obligations from the parties' agreement; bad faith
performance is an ordinary breach of contract."0 Fifth, good
faith in contract enforcement is a condition to the valid exercise
of remedial rights that contract or statute provides.
The meaning of "good faith" varies with its function in these
different contexts. A holder in due course, for example, might be
acting in good faith when honest and careful, but honesty and
care do not indicate that the party has not breached a con-
tract.2' Nonetheless, the statutory definitions of good faith ap-
ply to all contexts. Resulting confusion tends to empty "good
faith" of practical meaning, allowing it too easily to be cited as
mere homily, and undermining its value for those cases in which
it is needed.2
Moreover, section 1-203 lumps performance and enforcement
together as "obligations." Good faith in contract performance is
an obligation, the breach of which is an ordinary breach of con-
tract.2 3 Good faith in contract enforcement, however, is a condi-
18. See Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing cases
that found "bad faith" to be synonymous with "fraud" and stating that under the
U.C.C., "a lack of 'good faith' ... means some type of afiative action consisting
of at least constructive fraud or a design to mislead or deceive another").
19. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Mod-
ifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA
L. REv. 849, 879-80 (1979). For a different view, see Jason Scott Johnston, Default
Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Con-
tract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY J. 335 (1993).
20. See U.C.C. §§ 1-106(2), 1-203, 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1) (1990); see also infra
text accompanying notes 36-52 (discussing remedies in a bad faith performance
breach of contract action).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 36-52.
22. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that U.C.C. § 1-203 is "directive, not
remedial." Tanner v. Church's Fried Chicken, 582 So. 2d 449, 452 (Ala. 1991); Gov-
ernment St. Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 553 So. 2d 68, 72 (Ala. 1989); Chandler
v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976). However, § 1-106(2) provides:
"Any right or obligation declared by this Act is enforceable by action unless the
provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect." U.C.C. § 1-106(2)
(1990). Therefore, a breach of the obligation stated in § 1-203 should be enforceable.
23. The remedies awarded in bad faith performance cases are the same as those
1538
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tion, the nonoccurrence of which disables a party from exercising
contractual or statutory rights or powers of contract enforce-
ment.' An aggrieved buyer who covers, for example, may re-
cover damages measured by the difference between the cover
price and the contract price if the buyer covers in good faith."
A buyer who covers in bad faith is not liable for damages to the
seller; rather, bad faith disallows the cover-based remedy and
remits the buyer to the market price formula." Similarly, a
lender with a power to accelerate payment of a loan when he is
insecure has the "power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired." 7 A
lender who acts in bad faith loses the power to accelerate, but is
not liable for damages unless other actions constitute a
breach.'
More important problems center on the definitions of "good
faith." In Article 1, good faith is defined as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned;"29 in Article 2, for mer-
chants, good faith means "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.""0
The main issue in most discussions involves the question of sub-
jective and objective standards. "Honesty" is supposed to be a
subjective standard, while "reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing" is an objective standard, though presumably not
the same as standards of reasonableness, commercial reason-
ableness, or due care. Though the issue of subjective and objec-
awarded for "any garden variety breach of contract." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Aitfillisch Constr. Co., 139 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1977). Expectation damages
are the preferred remedy. See, e.g., Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 287
N.E.2d 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251 (Mass. 1977); Pernet v. Peabody Eng'g Corp., 248 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div.
1964); Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236 (Okla. 1972),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
24. See Andersen, supra note 4, at 325-26 (arguing that good faith in enforcement
is distinct from good faith in performance).
25. U.C.C. § 2-712(1)-(2) (1990).
26. Id. § 2-711(1). Section 2-713(1)-(2) sets out the market price formula.
27. Id. § 1-208.
28. See id.
29. Id. § 1-201(19).
30. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
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tive standards can be significant,31 a larger problem merits pri-
mary attention: few discussions clarify what either standard
seeks to measure and for what purpose. Not surprisingly, neither
definition succeeds in distinguishing good from bad faith in
contract performance and enforcement generally.
"Honesty in fact" was intended to govern in the good faith
purchaser and holder in due course contexts." Perhaps the
drafters thought contract performance and enforcement were
contexts requiring a different meaning, allowed by the chapeau
to section 1-201. 31 If so, they should have made their intention
clear.34 Some cases of bad faith in contract performance and
enforcement involve dishonesty.35 But dishonesty generally does
not distinguish good from bad faith in these contexts.
Consider Dorsey Brothers, Inc. v. Anderson,6 in which a
farmer contracted to grow and sell a snap bean crop for a price
to be calculated following harvest by the buyer.3 ' The contract
provided that the buyer would "determine when the beans were
ripe for harvest," thus conferring discretion on the buyer to de-
termine the time for its own performance. 8 A drought damaged
much of the bean crop in the region, including a portion of the
seller's crop." The buyer did not harvest the seller's crop when
31. See infra text accompanying notes 128-35.
32. Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLuM. L. REV. 798, 812-13 (1958); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance
and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 666, 668 (1963). Revisions to Articles 3 and 4 have since added an objective
standard. See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c) (1990).
33. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (1990) (stating that definitions provided in the section
apply "unless the context otherwise requires"); see also Richards Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1032-33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the "context" in
which good faith is required); Watseka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775,
780-81 (Ill. 1990).
34. Compare First NH Banks Granite State v. Scarborough, 615 A.2d 248 (Me.
1992) (limiting "good faith" in § 1-203 to honesty in fact) with St. Benedict's Dev.
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) (analogous case governed by
common law).
35. See, e.g., Umlas v. Acey Oldsmobile, Inc., 310 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Civ. Ct. 1970)
(holding that dishonest appraisal of a used car is bad faith).
36. 287 A.2d 270 (Md. 1972).
37. Id. at 271.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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it was ripe, but delayed a few days to concentrate its harvesting
activities at other farms, where the crops were less severely
damaged.4" The delay in harvesting caused further damage to
the seller's crop, reducing the price eventually paid. 4' The court
upheld the jury's finding that the buyer performed in bad faith
by delaying the harvest because other harvesting activities were
more attractive.4 2 The buyer, however, did not make any dis-
honest representations; it simply delayed harvesting the seller's
crop.
The court's judgment seems correct.43 Now, imagine the buy-
er had been completely honest in acknowledging the seller's crop
was ripe, explaining forthrightly that other opportunities would
be more profitable. Taking seriously the definition of "good faith"
as honesty in fact, and nothing else, would suggest that the
imaginary buyer would have acted in good faith. I doubt any
court would so hold.
In the case of a merchant like the buyer in Dorsey Brothers,
some may think, "reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade" can make up for the deficiencies of "honesty in
fact."" In the several decades since the U.C.C. was promulgat-
ed, however, this definition has done little discernible work in
the courts. Many courts ignore it, or cite it and then ignore it, as
they do the honesty definition. A few take the merchant's defini-
tion seriously, requiring expert testimony to prove the existence
of such standards.45 Parties attempting the proof, however, of-
ten fail.46
In a case like Dorsey Brothers, the merchant's definition does
not articulate the distinction between good and bad faith perfor-
mance of the contract. Imagine the buyer had proved that buy-
40. Id. at 272.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
44. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
45. See Brattleboro Auto Sales, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 633 F.2d
649, 651 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) (proof required but not given); Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1476 (D. Wyo. 1987) (applying
Wyoming law) (proof established by expert giving examples); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart,
Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Mass. 1980) (proof required but not given).
46. See Brattleboro Auto Sales, 633 F.2d at 651; Zapatha, 408 N.E.2d at 1378.
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ers in the trade often treated growers in the same way, though
comparable contracts did not usually include a promise to har-
vest when the buyer decided the crop was ripe. In that case,
standards of fair dealing in the trade might be either reasonable
and applicable or unreasonable and irrelevant. If the standards
are reasonable, they exonerate the buyer of bad faith. If unrea-
sonable, exoneration is avoided, but no objective standard is
substituted. The U.C.C. then provides no legal basis to hold the
buyer in breach when he discloses his reason for delaying the
harvest.
Yet, I suggest, the frank buyer should be held in breach
whether or not standards of fair dealing in the trade so require.
The basis for this conclusion lies in U.C.C.- governed cases hold-
ing that good faith requires action for reasons within the parties'
justifiable expectations.47 These cases supplant the U.C.C. defi-
nitions with the counterpart common law obligation." The crux
in Dorsey Brothers is that the buyer committed to harvesting
when the crop was ripe. The buyer thereby gave up the opportu-
nity to harvest when it was most advantageous to do so (should
the two times prove incompatible)." The buyer recaptured the
47. E.g., Davis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 873 F.2d 888, 896-97 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a failure to approve a distributor's assignment was in bad faith be-
cause discretion was not used for a valid business reason); A.U. Rustproofing Ctr. v.
Gulf Oil, 755 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a supplier must set
prices in a distribution contract in a commercially reasonable manner); Best v. Unit-
ed States Natl Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987) (requiring that a bank set its
fee for insufficient funds for reasons within the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties); Columbus Milk Producers Co-Op v. Wisconsin Dep't of Agric., 180 N.W.2d 617,
622 (Wis. 1970) (holding that a price must be set at the competitive price as would
be reasonably expected); see also Richard Short Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 799 F.2d
415, 422 (8th Cir. 1986) (requiring that the claimant show "prohibited motive" in es-
tablishing bad faith).
48. E.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1983); E.J. Albrecht Co. v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 164 F.2d 389, 393-94 (7th Cir. 1947); Hagans, Brown
& Gibbs v. First Nat'l Bank, 783 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Alaska 1989); Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 84445 (Cal. 1985); Cheney v. Jemmett, 693 P.2d 1031,
1034-35 (Idaho 1984); Foster Enters. v. Germania Fed. Say. & Loan, 421 N.E.2d
1375 (Ill. App. 1981); Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 50,
54 (Neb. 1988); Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193-94 (N.H. 1989)
(Souter, J.); Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., 649 P.2d 820, 825 (Utah 1982); see also supra
notes 3-4.
49. See Dorsey Bros., Inc. v. Anderson, 287 A.2d 270, 272-73 (Md. 1972).
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forgone opportunity by delaying the harvest to pursue the better
crop elsewhere.' Such a buyer performs in bad faith, however
candid its communications with the seller and however opportu-
nistic the practice in the trade: the buyer acted for a reason
disallowed by the parties' agreement. As the court held, the jury
could conclude that the buyer's decision not to harvest the beans
was unreasonable because it was not based on reasons allowed
by the agreement.5
The lesson of Dorsey Brothers can be widely generalized, as
Eric Andersen and I have shown in several publications and will
document fully in our forthcoming treatise.2 Neither "honesty
in fact" nor "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade" articulate the distinction between good and bad faith
in contract performance and enforcement. In these contexts, the
new definitional provisions should emphasize the crucial role of
reasons allowed and disallowed by the parties' agreement, un-
derstood contextually.
B. Proposals for Revision
Section 1-203 should distinguish between the performance and
enforcement contexts as follows:
§ 1-203. Principle of Good Faith.
(1) Every contract within this Act includes an obligation of
good faith in its performance.
(2) Every contract within this Act includes a condition that
enforcement rights provided by the contract or this Act be
asserted in good faith.
The comment should indicate that good faith changes its mean-
ing as its function changes in different contexts, making clear
that section 1-203 concerns the performance and enforcement
functions of good faith. The comments also should repeat that
the section 1-203 good faith requirements are not the basis for
50. Id.
51. Id. at 273. The court declined to apply the U.C.C. because the parties had not
briefed or argued its applicability to this type of transaction. Id.
52. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 3; Burton & Andersen, The World of a
Contract, supra note 4, at 75-76; Burton, Good Faith Performance, supra note 3, at
11; Burton, More on Good Faith, supra note 4, at 500.
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claims in tort nor other claims independent of the parties'
agreement.53 These requirements implement the parties' agree-
ment, understood in its commercial context, excluding subterfug-
es and evasions.54 Clarifying this section's scope of application
and dependence on the parties' agreement should help to dis-
courage prayerful litigation.
The difficulties are greater in drafting the definitions. It may
be tempting to change section 1-201(19) to track the simple for-
mula in the revised U.C.C. section 3-103(a)(4): " 'Good faith'
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing.""5 This would be a mistake, re-
peating the most serious error in drafting the current good faith
provisions. A definition aimed at the problems of holders in due
course is not appropriate when the performance and enforce-
ment of contracts is in issue.5" The goal should be to articulate
the distinction between good and bad faith in contract perfor-
mance and enforcement as distinct from other contexts in which
good faith functions.
Accordingly, I propose the following definitional provision:5"
53. PEB COMMENTARY SECTION 1-203, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that § 1-203
does not support an independent cause of action).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1979); Summers,
"Good Faith", supra note 14, at 207-16.
55. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. b (1979); Farnsworth, supra
note 32, at 668.
57. Incidentally, U.C.C. § 1-102, prohibiting disclaimers of the requirement of good
faith, should be clarified as follows, with brackets indicating deletions from the cur-
rent text and italics indicating additions:
§ 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the [obligations]
requirements of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed
by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement [but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such
obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unrea-
sonable]. The parties may by agreement determine what in particular such
requirements shall permit or prohibit, provided such agreement does not
render the contract unenforceable.
This proposal clarifies that the abstract requirements of good faith, etc., apply in
every contract, while the parties give them concrete meaning by their agreement.
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§ 1-201. General Definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subse-
quent Articles of this Act which are applicable to specific
Articles or Parts hereof, and unless the context otherwise re-
quires, in this Act:
(19) "Good faith" of a purchaser or holder means honesty
in fact. "Good faith" in contract performance means exercis-
ing any discretion for reasons within the parties' justifiable
expectations arising from their agreement. "Good faith" in
contract enforcement means asserting any remedial powers,
whether provided by contract or law, when justified by their
remedial purposes.
No special definition is needed for merchants in Article 2 trans-
actions. The fact that consumers have justifiable expectations of
fair dealing from merchants is subsumed in this definition, and
this fact might be pointed out in a comment to the definition of
"merchant" in Article 2. Merchants, however, also may have
justifiable expectations that consumers will exercise discretion
reasonably, as when a consumer benefits from a condition of
satisfaction.58 In principle, the obligation should run both ways,
although, in practice, it may constrain merchants more often
and more tightly.
The proposed definition of good faith in contract performance
is intended to articulate the distinction between good and bad
faith in that context. It supposes that the distinctive mission of
a good faith performance obligation is to police a contract party's
exercise of contractual discretion. In Dorsey Brothers,59 the con-
tract conferred discretion on the buyer to decide when the crop
was ripe."° Discretion similarly may be conferred on a party
whose requirements or output determine the quantity of goods
to be delivered,"' whose satisfaction determines the required
quality of goods or services,62 who retains a power to set the
58. E.g., Maas v. Scoboda, 195 N.W.2d 491, 498 (Neb. 1972).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 36-52.
60. Dorsey Bros., Inc. v. Anderson, 287 A.2d 270, 271 (Md. 1972).
61. See supra note 5.
62. See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 4, at 401; Burton, Good Faith Per-
formance, supra note 3, at 12-13.
19941 1545
1546 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1533
contract price,63 who controls the occurrence of a condition to
its own duties of contract performance," or who similarly may
take any of a range of actions based on its own business judg-
ment. The kinds of discretion that may arise in contract perfor-
mance cannot be catalogued exhaustively. The cases clearly
indicate, however, that good faith functions distinctively to place
limits on a party's discretion in contract performance.65
The proposed definition rejects the position that contractual
discretion is unbridled unless the parties limit it by express
terms.6" Rather, it supposes, parties have expectations arising
from commitments presupposed by their agreement, which ex-
pectations concern the reasons for which discretion may be exer-
cised. In Dorsey Brothers," for example, both parties justifiably
expected that the buyer could delay the harvest for any reason
bearing on the ripeness of the beans-their color, size, dry-
ness.6" The seller might disagree with the buyer's judgment on
ripeness without legal recourse of any kind. When the buyer
delayed the harvest because harvesting other growers' crops
sooner was more profitable, the buyer acted for a reason outside
the seller's justifiable expectations. A reasonable seller would
have such expectations arising from the agreement for the buyer
to harvest "when he decides the crop is ripe." The agreement
thus permits the buyer to delay the harvest for some reasons
and disallows other reasons for the same act. Good faith is a
63. See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 4, at 397-99; Burton, Good Faith
Performance, supra note 3, at 9-10.
64. See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 4, at 401-02.
65. See, e.g., Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 502
(2d Cir. 1989); Greer Properties v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 457, 460-61 (7th
Cir. 1989); Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 875-78
(5th Cir. 1989); Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 738-41
(9th Cir. 1985); Action Eng'g v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, 670 F.2d 456, 460-62
(3d Cir. 1982); Carma Developers v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710 (Cal.
1992); Warner v. Konover, 553 A.2d 1138, 1140-41 (Conn. 1989); Julian v. Christo-
pher, 575 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1990); Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d
187 (N.H. 1989); Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 279, 283 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); Best v. U.S. Nael Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987);
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 971 (Pa.
1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 550-52 (2d ed. 1990).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 71-90.
67. Dorsey Bros., Inc. v. Anderson, 287 A.2d 270 (Md. 1972).
68. Id. at 271.
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matter of exercising discretion for reasons within the justifiable
expectations of the parties, arising from their agreement, under-
stood in the context in which the agreement was made.
The proposed definition also rejects the position that good
faith is a post-formation counterpart to the unconscionability
doctrine, licensing courts to impose obligations on the parties for
reasons of general fairness, morality, or policy.69 Questions con-
cerning the range of enforceable promises depend significantly
on general principles of fairness, morality, and policy, as imple-
mented by the law. Such principles may justify a broader or nar-
rower domain in which freedom of contract prevails in a society.
Once a court has decided that an agreement is enforceable, how-
ever, it has decided that the agreement is within the domain of
private ordering. The obligation to keep the agreement then
replaces overriding principles of fairness, morality, and policy.
Unless some event after formation justifies different treatment,
as when doctrines of modification, estoppel, waiver, material
breach, unjust enrichment, or commercial impracticability apply,
no justification warrants imposing additional obligations on the
parties irrespective of their voluntary words and acts.
The proposed definition affirms the autonomy of the parties to
structure their own relationship within the domain of freedom of
contract and against the backdrop of commercial practice. The
U.C.C.'s existing definition of "agreement" is a broad one, em-
phasizing the parties' actual bargain as evidenced by the con-
tract language or by implication from other circumstances in-
cluding course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of perfor-
mance, when appropriate.7 0 The bargain of the parties in fact
may include implied agreement on allowed and disallowed rea-
sons for exercising discretion in contract performance or enforce-
ment.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 91-127.
70. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1990); see Patterson, supra note 14, at 175.
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III. THE PRACTICE VIEW
The foregoing proposal will be called the "practice view" be-
cause it codifies the dominant approach in judicial practice. That
is, the proposal arises from a synthesis of hundreds of cases in
which courts have interpreted and applied common law and
statutory requirements of good faith in contract performance and
enforcement. "Good faith" thus takes on a concrete and workable
meaning from its use as a practical matter.
A legislator, however, is free to change even a settled judicial
practice. In this matter, I will argue, a change would be unwise.
Two main alternatives compete with the practice view. One
would constrict the role of good faith by giving effect to the ex-
press terms of a contract, literally interpreted, unless a party is
acting "opportunistically" and incompatibly with economic effi-
ciency. The other would enlarge the role of good faith greatly by
authorizing courts to impose new requirements on contract par-
ties from a sense of contractual morality arising from their
evolving relationship. I will argue that the dominant strain in
judicial practice occupies a middle ground that better accommo-
dates the interests of the public and the parties to a commercial
contract with discretion.
A. A Constricted Alternative
A legislator may consider whether operation of the U.C.C.'s
good faith requirements should be weaker than the prevailing
practice view. This could be accomplished by giving the parties'
express agreement a literal interpretation and good faith a sub-
ordinate and narrow role. On this view, a contract party acts in
bad faith only when acting opportunistically to undermine the
efficiency of the bargain, as when one party has performed first
or otherwise relied to its detriment and the other party demands
benefits for which it did not bargain. The classic example would
be the contract modification cases supporting the preexisting
duty rule.71
71. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 97-98; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Econom-
ics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 141 (1989); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunis-
tic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 532-52 (1981).
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Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion in Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2 v. First Bank of Whiting72 illustrates the constricted ap-
proach.73 A creditor appealed the bankruptcy court's order sub-
ordinating the lender's secured claim to unsecured status be-
cause of the lender's bad faith conduct.74 The lender had ex-
tended credit to a retail merchant for some years.75 After the
merchant filed a Chapter 11 petition, the bankruptcy court ap-
proved a loan agreement establishing a $300,000 line of credit
for the merchant.76 The agreement gave the lender a lien on
most of the borrower's post-petition assets.77 The lender ad-
vanced funds under the post-petition line of credit to repay pre-
vious unsecured advances, in effect securing a previously unse-
cured debt.78 Two weeks later, the lender notified the borrower
that it would terminate the line of credit in two weeks.79 The
bankruptcy court found that this abrupt termination of the line
of credit constituted a breach of the obligation of good faith; con-
sequently, the court returned the lender to unsecured status.0
The appeals court vacated the order subordinating the lien.81
Judge Easterbrook, in obvious eagerness to distance his views
from those in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,82 rested the deci-
sion on the literal meaning of the contract for the post-petition
line of credit, which required five days' notice of cancellation
and, further, that "nothing provided herein shall constitute a
waiver of the right of the Bank to terminate financing at any
time":'
72. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
73. Judge Easterbrook took a similar approach in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,
815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987).
74. Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1353.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1354.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1363.
82. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying New York law). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 91-127 (discussing the KM.C. case).
83. Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1353.
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We do not doubt the force of the proverb that the letter
killeth, while the spirit giveth life. Literal implementation of
unadorned language may destroy the essence of the ven-
ture .... Yet knowledge that literal enforcement means some
mismatch between the parties' expectation and the outcome
does not imply a general duty of "kindness" in performance,
or of judicial oversight into whether a party had "good cause"
to act as it did. Parties to a contract are not each others' fidu-
ciaries; they are not bound to treat customers with the same
consideration reserved for their families.'
Judge Easterbrook's opinion should be criticized for construing
the contract without attempting as the standard rules of con-
tract interpretation and implication require to protect the justi-
fiable expectations of the parties arising from their agreement,
understood in its commercial context.8" He posed two alterna-
tives: interpret literally or open the door to requirements of
kindness and Monday morning quarterbacking by judges and
jurors. He rejected the latter and endorsed the former by de-
fault. His conclusion might be defensible if these were the only
alternatives. However, a third alternative is available. The court
in Southwest Savings & Loan Association v. Sunamp Systems,
Inc.,86 a case factually similar to Kham & Nate's, presented the
practice view well:
If contracting parties cannot profitably use their contractual
powers without fear that a jury will second-guess them under
a vague standard of good faith, the law will impair the pre-
dictability that an orderly commerce requires. Yet contracting
parties, hard as they may try, cannot reduce every under-
standing to a stated term. Instances inevitably arise where
84. Id. at 1357.
85. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-208, 2-105 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 200-205 (1979); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 162 (1965); E. Allan Farnsworth, "Mean-
ing" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 951 (1967); A. Brooke Overby, Bond-
age, Domination, and the Art of the Deal: An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in
Lender Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 1011-16 (1993).
For a detailed criticism of Judge Easterbrook's opinion, see Dennis M. Patterson, A
Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV.
503 (1991).
86. 838 P.2d 1314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
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one party exercises discretion retained or unforeclosed under
a contract in such a way as to deny the other a reasonably
expected benefit of the bargain .... The law of good faith,
though inexact, attempts a remedy for such abuse ....
In this case, therefore, inquiry does not end with recogni-
tion that [the lender] had contractual authority to freeze, and
ultimately terminate, [the borrowers] credit line. The ques-
tion is whether the jury might reasonably have found that
[the lender] wrongfully exercised this power "for a reason
beyond the risks" that [the borrower] assumed in its loan
agreement or for a reason inconsistent with [the borrowers]
"justified expectations." 7
On the practice view, the borrower's advocate in iam &
Nate's should have emphasized that only two weeks passed be-
tween concluding and cancelling the loan agreement. The lender
did not present evidence of events during those two weeks that
would justify the lender in changing its assessment of the
borrower's creditworthiness or security for the loan.8 If the
lender entered the loan agreement solely as a pretext to convert
unsecured debt into secured debt, intending all along to pull the
plug on the borrower after an indecent interval, it committed
promissory fraud. 9 Even if the lender decided to cancel later,
the borrower would reasonably expect cancellation only for rea-
sons showing that the borrower's creditworthiness or the
lender's security was impaired by subsequent events, not for
reasons available to the lender before the loan was extended.
Nothing prevented the lender from declining to enter the agree-
ment for any reason whatever. Having entered the agreement,
however, the lender gave up the opportunity to cancel for rea-
sons of regret-previously available reasons of creditworthiness
or insecurity.
The litigation and decision in Kham & Nate's should have
focused on whether the lender had a reason to downgrade the
borrower's creditworthiness or otherwise feel insecure based on
87. Id. at 1319-20 (citations omitted).
88. Kham & Nate's, 908 F.2d at 1353-54.
89. See Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 1975) (characterizing
bad faith as involving "fraud or a design to mislead or deceive another").
1994] 1551
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1533
information received after it made the loan, which would justify
its decision to cancel. If the lender had such a reason for cancel-
lation, the court should have respected its business judgment.
The agreement allowed the lender to protect its interest in re-
payment; presumably the lender agreed to a lower interest rate
in exchange for the right to cancel the loan if its interest became
insecure. Without such a reason, however, the lender acted in
bad faith by using its cancellation power for reasons outside the
justifiable expectations of the parties (and the bankruptcy
judge). The practice view allows cases to be litigated and decided
on such a basis, avoiding Judge Easterbrook's conceded mis-
match of literal terms to party expectations in the commercial
context.
The public has a general interest in the security of contractual
transactions. In contract performance and enforcement, this
interest supports protecting the parties' justifiable expectations
arising from agreements that have passed the tests of enforce-
ability. Specifically, a nondiscretion-exercising party may have
justifiable expectations, arising from the parties' agreement, that
the other will exercise discretion for expectable reasons in the
relevant business context." By contrast, a discretion-exercising
party has no legitimate interest in preserving an opportunity to
exercise discretion for any and all reasons, including those out-
side the expectable range, such as reasons of cronyism or regret
at having entered the contract.
The practice view is a workable alternative allowing courts to
protect the nondiscretion-exercising party's justifiable expecta-
tions. It does not impose obligations of kindness or unwarranted
second-guessing. Accordingly, the practice view should be pre-
ferred to a constricted view focused on the literal meaning of the
express contract terms.
B. An Enlarged Alternative
The extremity of Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Kham &
Nate's appears to have been in reaction to a far broader view of
90. As Judge Cardozo famously put it, "We are not to suppose that one party was
to be placed at the mercy of the other." Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E.
214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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good faith endorsed by the court in KM.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co."' In KM.C., the court held a lender liable for failing to give
notice before refusing to make further advances under a line of
credit.9 2 The lender had agreed to extend credit to a maximum
of $3 million, increased later to $3.5 million, with outstanding
amounts payable on demand. 3 The borrower pledged its ac-
counts receivable and inventory as security, with the availability
of credit depending on a borrowing base formula. 4 In addition,
the parties agreed to a cash management lockbox arrangement,
whereby the borrower deposited all of its receipts in a blocked
account; consequently, the borrower had access to working capi-
tal only by borrowing under the line of credit.95 Some years lat-
er, the lender refused a request to raise the credit limit and,
days later, refused without notice to advance $800,000 requested
by the borrower, despite the fact that the financing agreement
allowed the advance.96 The lender then dishonored checks
drawn by the borrower, causing the borrower's business to col-
lapse.97 A jury awarded the borrower damages amounting to
$7.5 million. 8
91. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). A similar reaction may have led the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine to deny any requirement of good faith performance or en-
forcement outside the U.C.C. and to confine the U.C.C. requirements to the letter of
the statutory definitions. See Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Natl Bank, 605 A.2d
609, 613-14 (Me. 1992) (limiting § 1-203 to transactions governed by the U.C.C. and
refusing to recognize a common law obligation of good faith); see also First NH
Banks Granite State v. Scarborough, 615 A.2d 248 (Me. 1992) (limiting "good faith"
in § 1-203 to honesty in fact). The federal courts, applying Maine law, had given
good faith an expansive meaning comparable to that in K.M.C. See Reid v. Key
Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987); Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., 662 F.
Supp. 1132 (D. Me. 1987). These decisions in effect have been repudiated, to the
great dismay of the federal district judge for the district of Maine. See People's Heri-
tage Sav. Bank v. Recoll Management, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 159, 165-70 (D. Me. 1993);
see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983) (rejecting an implied
tort duty of good faith and fair dealing in contracts under Texas law).
92. KM.C., 757 F.2d at 760.
93. Id. at 754.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 759.
96. Id. at 754, 762.
97. Id. at 754.
98. Id. at 755.
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The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury award.9 The lower court
magistrate had observed that a personality conflict existed be-
tween the loan officer and the borrower's chief officer and that
the loan officer, without giving notice, refused to lend more due
to his disapproval of this officer's management philosophy.0 0
Several bankers testified that, because the loan was adequately
secured, a reasonable lender would have given notice.'0 ' The
borrower had requested an increase in the credit limit days be-
fore, and the lender may have been concerned about whether the
borrower's checks would all clear, even with the requested ad-
vance and an increased line of credit.'0 ' Nonetheless, evidence
of a mix of reasons for and against the lender's belief that the
borrower was in trouble supported the verdict.' The court al-
so emphasized the long-term interactive relationship of the par-
ties and the lender's lockbox control over the borrower's cash
flow. 10
4
K.M.C. illustrates an approach to good faith known to aca-
demics as "relational contract law." Classical or neoclassical
contract law is supposed to isolate each transaction from any
web of transactions in which it might be embedded and to freeze
the parties' rights and duties as they were at the time of con-
tracting.' 5 Relational contract law, by contrast, emphasizes a
particular contract's connections with the parties' previous and
future dealings and allows their rights and duties to evolve
during the course of performance.' 6 The norms of contractual
relations are complex, involving the values of reciprocity, soli-
darity, cooperation, and risk sharing.' Leading academic the-
99. Id. at 766.
100. Id. at 761.
101. Id. at 761-62.
102. Id. at 762.
103. Id. at 760-63.
104. Id. at 759-62.
105. Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 856
(1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations].
106. Id.; see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1981).
107. See Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L.
REV. 340, 360-65 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract].
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orists have endorsed the expansion of relational considerations
in contract law,10 8 sometimes hanging the relational hat on the
doctrinal peg of good faith,0 9 despite a paucity of existing au-
thority for construing good faith to require decency or altruism
beyond the agreement."0
By imposing an agreement-independent "contractual morality"
on the lender,"' the relational view of good faith clearly goes
beyond the common requirement that a discretion exercising
party act for reasons permitted by the agreement. KM.C. licens-
es judges and jurors to second-guess the business judgment of
discretion-exercising parties far more than standards aiming to
protect the parties' justified expectations arising from their
agreement. In this case, one need not go so far as the lender,
who argued that its discretion was unbridled or that no good
faith obligation attached to a refusal to advance funds because
the loans were payable on demand anyway. The lender could
have maintained that it was under a good faith obligation and
acted in good faith.
According to the practice view, the court should review the
loan officer's decision to terminate the line of credit to protect
the justifiable expectations of borrower and lender. The borrower
justifiably expects the lender to base its decision whether to ad-
vance further funds on ordinary business reasons, such as the
borrower's creditworthiness and the security for the loan. The
lender justifiably expects its judgments of creditworthiness and
insecurity to be final, as the parties intended by allowing the
bank to lend less than the credit limit and to call the notes due
108. The leading figure in this movement is Ian R. Macneil. See, e.g., IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE NEw SocIAL CONTRACT (1980); Macneil, Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations, supra note 105; Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 107.
109. E.g., Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 789, 795-98 (1993).
110. In addition to ICM.C., reported appellate opinions arguably supporting distinc-
tively relational interpretations of good faith in contract performance and enforce-
ment are J.J. Brooksbank Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 337 N.W.2d 372 (Minn.
1983); Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 351 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976); see
also Nanakuli Paving & Rack Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 805-06 (9th Cir.
1981).
111. See Summers, General Duty, supra note 14, at 811; Summers, 'Good Faith,"
supra note 14.
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on demand. Analytically, a loan officer makes a judgment of
creditworthiness or insecurity in three steps: she identifies all
relevant reasons, weighs those reasons, and decides as indicated
by the stronger reasons. According to the practice view, the
court should review the loan officer's decisions to determine
whether she identified or could have identified contractually
permitted reasons for easily terminating the line of credit. A
court should not review the loan officer's business judgment to
determine whether she weighed those reasons correctly."'
The court in KM.C. acknowledged the crucial fact that the
jury could not find that the loan officer did not have a valid
business reason for refusing to advance the funds without prior
notice."' In particular, evidence indicated that the loan officer
had a reasonable belief that the borrower's checks would bounce
even with the advance."' This gave the lender a permitted
reason for terminating the line of credit, the weight of which
was within its loan officer's discretion.
The error in K.M. C., in my view, was in allowing the jury to
reweigh the relevant reasons; disagreement merely on the
weight of reasons led to a $7.5 million judgment against the
lender. The business judgment-how serious the borrower's
financial crisis was-should be left to the lender, where the
agreement put it. Not surprisingly, almost all courts to speak on
the holding in KM.C. have questioned, limited, disapproved, or
refused to follow it. 1
15
112. For elaboration on weighing reasons, see STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN
GOOD FAITH 51-62 (1992).
113. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1985).
114. Id.
115. E.g., Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1057-
58 (2d Cir. 1992); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351,
1358 (7th Cir. 1990); National Westminster Bank v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd sub nom. Yaeger v. National Westminister, 962 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1992); Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 81 B.R. 194, 199 (D. Mass. 1987);
East Lansing State Bank v. Red Cedar Constr. Co. (In re Red Cedar Constr. Co.),
63 B.R. 228, 235-38 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986); Flagship Natl Bank v. Gray Distrib.
Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Centerre Bank v. Dis-
tributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Gaul v. Olympia Fitness Ctr.,
623 N.E.2d 1281, 1287-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Apart from the cases applying
Maine law, discussed supra note 91, the only authority following KM.C. is Compo-
nents Direct, Inc. v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 572 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (App.
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Once a court decides that an agreement is enforceable, it
should enforce the agreement."6 The primary interests in con-
tract performance, then, are the public interest in the security of
contracts and the parties' expectation interests arising from
their agreement. The nondiscretion-exercising party ordinarily
has justifiable expectations that the other will exercise discre-
tion for expectable reasons in the relevant business context.
When this interest is fully protected by the practice view, no
further contractual interest is deserving of legal protection by
enlarged good faith requirements.
Discretion is often bargained for, resulting in offsetting bene-
fits to the other party, as when the lender makes a loan at a
lower interest rate because the loan agreement allows the loan
to be terminated easily. A party with agreed discretion does not
enjoy discretion as agreed unless its judgment on the weight of
permitted reasons is final. The enlarged view of good faith does
not respect this interest.
Judges and jurors are poorly suited to second-guess the judg-
ments involved in commercial contracts allowing discretion. The
cold judicial reception to cases exemplifying a relational ap-
proach suggests that codification of an enlarged view will invite
too much litigation with no realistic prospect of recovery. Accord-
ingly, the practice view is preferable to an enlarged view of con-
tractual good faith.
C. Assorted Endnotes
Consideration of two other issues may be useful in light of the
recent emergence of the practice view. The first is the more gen-
eral question of whether the jurisprudence of Article 2 should be
revised to incorporate relational contract theory, using good
faith as a principal vehicle. The second concerns the role of sub-
jective and objective standards of good faith.
Div. 1991).
116. See also Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981
DuxE L.J. 619 (arguing that expansive interpretations of the good faith obligation
extends parties' obligations beyond bargained for contractual duties and leads to
inconsistent enforcement of obligations).
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1. Relational Contract Theory
Professor Richard E. Speidel, the Reporter to the Drafting
Committee revising Article 2 for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law, recently floated some
proposals to incorporate relational contract theory into Article 2,
using the definition of "good faith" as a principal vehicle. He is
considering revising the definition to require "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable [commercial] standards of fair
dealing in the conduct or transaction involved.""' A comment
would state that" 'sometimes good faith is the basis for proscrib-
ing behavior that violates basic standards of decency, either
generally or in the particular conduct of the transaction in-
volved. Examples include, but are not limited to, the use of sub-
terfuges and evasions.' "11 He wrote that this definition would
support a finding of bad faith "when one party's conduct deviates
from internal norms generated by the relationship" beyond the
agreement."9 These norms include reciprocity, solidarity, coop-
eration, and risk sharing, at least in longer term contracts with
imprecise terms and interdependence between the parties be-
yond a single transaction.2 °
I do not think this would be a wise innovation, in either Arti-
cle 1 or 2. Following Ian Macneil,'' Professor Speidel under-
stands relational norms not only to describe actual behavior, but
also somehow to become "the 'ought' by which the relationship is
governed."'22 The jump to "ought" is crucial to any argument
117. Speidel, supra note 109, at 796-97. The current definition requires "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1990) (emphasis added).
118. Speidel, supra note 109, at 797 (crediting proposal for Article 1 from Professor
E. Allan Farnsworth).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 792-93.
121. Macneil has argued:
The common norms are essential to any behavior we might be willing to
call contractual and they become, by conversion of is to ought, principles
of right action as well. Similarly, given a discrete transaction, the discrete
norm reflects both the behavior and the oughts growing out [of] it, just
as, given relational contracts, the relational norms reflect both behavior
and the oughts emerging from it.
Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 107, at 346 (footnote omitted).
122. Speidel, supra note 109, at 793.
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for legislating relational norms. Laws should be enforced against
people only when they are under genuine obligations to do what
the law commands.'23
I see three insurmountable problems with the relational "con-
version of is to ought."' First, as is well known to students of
philosophy since Hume, empirical or analytical truths cannot be
simply converted to normative status as guides to conduct. An
additional normative argument is needed to avoid the obvious
nonsequitur. Second, people are under no general obligation to
do as they have done in the past or as everyone else does in
similar circumstances. Situations in which decency or morality
requires one to change behavior or resist the herd are common.
Third, although relational norms express values, this is not
sufficient to yield enforceable obligations. For example, generosi-
ty (like many virtues) is praiseworthy, but it should not be
forced.
One could argue that people rely on relational patterns over
time and that such reliance should be protected when reason-
able." But reliance on facts not amounting to a commitment
by a person is problematic as a basis for proceeding against that
person. Protecting reliance, moreover, is not a relational norm.
One could argue that the parties agreed to a type of relationship,
like a franchise, that is defined by common practice to include
obligations beyond the written contract."6 The ground of the
obligation then would be the parties' agreement or fair play, not
"the relationship" in the relevant sense. Consequently, there
does not appear to be a legitimate ground for enforcing relation-
al norms as such.2 7
123. Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Con-
tract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 115 (1993).
124. Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 107, at 346.
125. See Gillian M. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990) (discussing the contractual rela-
tionship between franchisee and franchisor).
126. See id. at 930; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 875-85 (1992) (discussing the dual roles of
subjective and objective consent in contractual relationships).
127. I am unaware of any argument showing that "the relationship" itself is a
ground of political obligation. Relational contract theory is sociological in nature, not
a matter of political morality.
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Professor Macneil's development of relational contract theory
nonetheless is important. Relational considerations are among
the reasons leading to agreements and adjustments as perfor-
mance evolves. Any understanding of contract practices, as dis-
tinct from contract law, would be sorely impoverished were it to
neglect the relational perspective.
In my view, however, relational norms presumptively should
remain implicit in the context. These norms may guide the
parties' nonobligatory accommodations, such as those of grati-
tude and prudence, unless the norms lead to voluntary words or
acts justifying an enforceable obligation. The parties have rights
as of the time of contract formation. These rights should change
only when subsequent events ground new rights, as when the
parties agree to change them (modification), when one party
intentionally and knowingly relinquishes them (waiver), when
one party foreseeably induces reliance on new rights and the
other party relies to its detriment (estoppel), or when changed
circumstances undermine the authority of the parties' agreement
(impracticability/frustration). Revised versions of Articles 1 and
2 can facilitate such changes in legal relations to protect party
expectations evolving away from those at the time of contract
formation.
Relational considerations should be introduced so that legisla-
tors and litigators can see the changes and their justifications
clearly. Concepts of "good faith," "the relationship," and "solidar-
ity" are too vague in the abstract to ensure accountability in the
lawmaking process or later to discourage prayerful litigation.
More important, good faith in contract performance and enforce-
ment is close to acquiring a settled meaning within judicial prac-
tice. This meaning does not include a relational component. A
better drafting strategy would allow good faith to settle down
within the practice view, using other doctrinal concepts to break
new ground.
2. Subjective and Objective Standards
As previously stated, the main issue in most academic discus-
sions of good faith under the U.C.C. involves the question of
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subjective and objective standards.'28 Few discussions, how-
ever, clarify what either standard seeks to measure and for what
purpose. A principal virtue of the practice view is that it makes
the goal clear: good faith in contract performance and enforce-
ment aims to ensure that a discretion-exercising party acts for
reasons within the justifiable expectations of the other party.
The question of subjective and objective standards enters the
practice view when we try to determine which kinds of reasons
are valid for this purpose.
A reason for action generally is the marriage of a rule, princi-
ple, value, desire, or other abstract prescription-paradigmatic-
ally, that some act should be done when some generic fact is
instantiated-with a concrete fact that invokes it. For example,
a complete reason might be stated as follows: all promises
should be performed; Jake promised to mow the lawn whenever
needed; the lawn needs mowing, so Jake should mow. Typically,
however, people have several reasons for and against doing most
of the things they do. Jake's promise is a reason to mow the
lawn, but he also might mow it because he likes to maintain a
manicured front yard, he wants to avoid his neighbor's disap-
proval, or the subdivision rules require him to do it, and so on.
The facts may be such that all of these reasons are available to
Jake, but only one of them may move him to mow the lawn. An
objective conception of a reason for action emphasizes the avail-
ability of a reason in the circumstances of action; a subjective
conception focuses on the reasons that move the actor.
Judicial practice supports either an objective or subjective
interpretation of the reasons that may justify a discretion-exer-
cising party's action. Most cases consider only whether the ac-
tion was reasonable, commercially reasonable, or justified by a
reason within the justifiable expectations of the parties.'29
Some consider whether the discretion-exercising party was moti-
vated by the right kinds of reasons.3 0 No cases have been
128. See supra text accompanying note 31.
129. E.g., Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844-46 (Cal. 1985); Cheney
v. Jemmett, 693 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Idaho 1984); Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-
Lincoln, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 50 (Neb. 1988); Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562
A.2d 187, 193-96 (N.H. 1989); Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., 649 P.2d 820, 825 (Utah
1982).
130. E.g., Leberman v. John Blair & Co., 880 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (2d Cir. 1989);
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found that turn on the difference. The U.C.C. should address the
problem, if at all, only in an official comment.
The better view emphasizes the objective interpretation of a
reason for action, dispensing with any inquiry into subjective
motivation.'' In addition to the well-known difficulties in
proving subjective motivation, we should remember what con-
tract law is trying to do. Much of the practice view of good faith
is informed, I believe, by an awareness that bad faith perfor-
mance is a breach of contract; the preferred remedy is compen-
sation for harm to a nondiscretion-exercising party's expectation
interest. 2 Accordingly, a party should be held to perform in
bad faith only when the other party's expectation interest was
harmed. Assume a discretion-exercising party had available to it
many contractually permitted reasons for terminating a line of
credit but was motivated to terminate by disallowed reasons.
Apparently, then, the breach does not harm the borrower's con-
tractual expectation interest; the lender could have terminated
the line of credit anyhow, and the borrower had no justifiable
expectation otherwise.13 Laws against racial, gender, and
similar invidious discriminations in employment might properly
judge the character of a discriminating employer by focusing on
its motivation and penalizing improper motivation. These laws
attempt to reshape character to expel prejudice. Contract law, by
contrast, provides compensation for harm; it does not punish
wrongdoing or reshape character.
In any case, both permissible and impermissible reasons may
be available in the circumstances of action, as the above discus-
Richard Short Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 799 F.2d 415, 422 (8th Cir. 1986); Hagans,
Brown & Gibbs v. First Natl Bank, 783 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Alaska 1989).
131. This approach is a change from my view in Steven J. Burton, Breach of Con-
tract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369,
385-92 (1980) (suggesting a subjective inquiry as part of the good faith determina-
tion).
132. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 n.6
(Mass. 1977); Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236, 1247-
49 (Okla.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
133. See Palombi v. Getty Oil Co., 501 F. Supp. 158, 162 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 974 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984).
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sion of K.M.C. suggests. 34 Problems of mixed reasons arise
rarely in reported cases, however.' Revised Articles 1 and 2
should address this issue only in comments, if at all. Under an
objective standard, the analysis of mixed reasons would be rela-
tively straightforward: the discretion-exercising party, not a
judge or jury, is entitled to weigh the competing reasons. A par-
ty, therefore, would be acting in good faith whenever significant
contractually permitted reasons for its actions were available.
This result best accommodates the discretion-exercising party's
interest in deference by judge and jury with the other party's
interest in nonarbitrary and expectable reasons for exercising
discretion.
Under a subjective standard, the problem is more complicated.
The discretion-exercising party could be acting in bad faith if the
excluded reasons were a factor, a significant factor, a substantial
factor, or the predominant factor in the decision. The same ac-
commodation of interests argues in favor of a more deferential
standard for sorting mixed reasons-a substantial or predomi-
nant reason test.
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic good faith provisions in Articles 1 and 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code should be revised to articulate the prac-
tice view of good faith in contract performance and enforcement.
The practice view is dominant in recent judicial practice. It
holds that good faith in these contexts polices a party's discre-
tion by limiting the reasons for which discretion may be exer-
cised legitimately. Good faith in contract performance should
mean exercising any discretion for reasons within the parties'
justifiable expectations arising from their agreement understood
in the commercial context in which the agreement was made.
Similarly, good faith in contract enforcement should mean as-
134. See supra text accompanying notes 91-116.
135. The classic case is Parev Products Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147 (2d
Cir. 1941). See also Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979);
Mechanical Ice Tray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 144 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 844 (1945).
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serting any remedial powers, whether provided by contract or
law, when justified by their remedial purposes.
The public has an interest in the security of contractual trans-
actions. In contract performance and enforcement, we should
protect the parties' justifiable expectations arising from agree-
ments that have passed the tests of enforceability. A party with
agreed discretion has justifiable expectations that its discretion-
ary judgments will be respected by judge and jury. A
nondiscretion-exercising party may have justifiable expectations
that the other will act for expectable reasons in the relevant
business context. The practice view accommodates these inter-
ests. It requires review to ensure a discretion-exercising party's
action is justifiable by reasons permitted by the parties' agree-
ment, but leaves the weight of permitted reasons to that party's
business judgment.
Competing alternatives tend to deny one or the other party's
interests. The constricted view exalts the literal terms of a con-
tract, leaving a nondiscretion-exercising party's reasonable ex-
pectations unprotected when they arise from commitments pre-
supposed by the parties' agreement. The enlarged view demotes
the parties' agreement in favor of vague "relational values" that
too easily can deny a party discretion for which it bargained.
The practice view charts a middle path rooted in the parties'
agreement, understood in its commercial context. It distinguish-
es good from bad faith in contract performance and enforcement.
When articulated clearly and enacted as statutory text, the prac-
tice view should help ensure that parties bring suits only when
they stand a reasonable chance of succeeding, and of succeeding
for good reason.
1564
